Emmanuel Macron is not the political force he once was. His minority government collapsed on Wednesday over a budget impasse. Whatever comes next, it is hard to see how the French president can effectively run his country, let alone influence the European Union.
But with the other half of the EU's traditional ‘Franco-German motor’ also in bad shape, EU members will be looking to France for leadership on a range of issues, from the war in Ukraine to the economy, as they brace for a fraying transatlantic partnership with Donald Trump in the White House.
The most pressing fear is that Trump will abandon Ukraine, leaving a big gap for Europeans to fill in terms of aid and ammunition as Russian forces make slow gains at huge cost to both sides. Given France's relative military heft, it has the potential to become an important backer of Kyiv among the big EU economies.
That was not always a given. France has traditionally favoured dialogue over deterrence towards Russia, sidelining concerns of former Soviet states in the EU. In the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it was the likes of Poland and Lithuania that called for robust EU support for Ukraine.
“There are many things that one can criticise about France in light of its stance on Ukraine, particularly on how long it took France to adapt,” Gesine Weber, fellow at the German Marshall Fund, tells The Parliament.
But France has changed its approach. In October, Macron welcomed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Paris to discuss his “victory plan” and additional aid for Ukraine. France’s military is also a major contributor to European efforts to train Ukrainian forces. The aim is to get an entire brigade ready for battle, with French equipment.
“Even if Poland has certainly beefed up its defence spending, Poland is not France in terms of economic performance and in terms of military capability,” says Weber. “In terms of diplomatic network, France is certainly a leading middle power.”
Germany leaves a gap
The French economy is second in the EU only to Germany, which has struggled to wean itself off Russian gas imports and whose record on Ukraine is also mixed. While it is a top supplier of equipment and funds, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has been slow to agree to send big-ticket weapons and remains steadfast against offering German-made cruise missiles.
Now that Scholz’s government has effectively collapsed, he will be unable to make any big decisions before elections, possibly in February. That assumes he wins, which polls show is unlikely. He has coined himself the "peace chancellor," which has further irked Ukraine supporters.
“France is currently best placed to take a leadership role in the EU, because it will take some time in Germany for a coalition to come together and someone has to take the first step,” says Weber.
Germany's last government took almost three months to form, in 2021.
Nevertheless, France’s economic weakness may limit the extent to which it can support Ukraine. With a budget deficit that could hit 6.2 per cent of GDP by the end of 2024, Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu told reporters in October that France would fall short of its pledge to donate up to €3bn in military aid to Ukraine this year.
Trouble at home
France’s budget woes could also hamper its ability to lead a wave of investment in the EU's economy – as prescribed by Mario Draghi in his report on boosting the bloc's competitiveness.
“How can you advocate what the Draghi report asks for, such as massive borrowing and public investment, when you yourself are not in a position to invest massively?” says Eric Maurice, policy analyst at the European Policy Centre.
To overcome doubts about its economic strength, Macron tapped the conservative budget hawk, Michel Barnier, as prime minister in September. Investors expressed relief at his appointment, but his government’s foundations were shaky after this summer’s snap election split the National Assembly into three broad blocs with no majority.
Brussels and international markets are on tenterhooks now that Barnier has resigned, following an extraordinary move to force his budget through the assembly. The far-right National Rally and a left-wing alliance made good on their threat to vote “yea” on no-confidence.
Institutional power
Besides the European Council, which gathers national leaders, the European Commission is another avenue for EU governments to influence the bloc’s politics, despite the official position that the Commissioners from each member state leave their national allegiances at the door of the Berlaymont.
Here, too, France’s power looks diminished compared to five years ago, at the start of Ursula von der Leyen’s first term. Back then, Commissioner Thierry Breton was on the rise, accumulating power over a range of portfolios. That gave France considerable weight at the top of the EU executive.
He and Von der Leyen locked horns, however, and she blocked Breton’s nomination for a second term. Macron's alternative, former foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné, has a grander-sounding job title as one of six executive vice-presidents (EVPs) but less responsibility in practice, with direct control of just one directorate-general. Breton had three.
Besides his leadership of DG Grow, tasked with handling the EU’s internal market, Séjourné has some responsibility for competitiveness – but must share it with Spain’s Teresa Ribera, another EVP.
“His authority on this crucial issue is not very clear,” says Maurice. A small consolation is that Séjourné will oversee work on a capital markets union – a file with the potential to increase private sources of funding for big projects.
Still, EU politics could be moving in a broadly French direction, with the rise of industrial policy and collective defence that play to French strengths – if domestic challenges don't interfere.
“France has to convince the EU it is taking this issue seriously,” says Sébastien Maillard, a former director of the Jacques Delors Institute. “Macron is showing he's doing the best he can to bring the budget back on track.”
The article has been updated to reflect the latest developments in the French government crisis.