Emmanuel Macron is not the power he once was. With a minority government, a crippling budget deficit and an all-time low approval rating of 22 per cent, some might say he’s barely in control of France, let alone Europe.
But with the other half of Europe’s traditional ‘Franco-German motor’ in even worse shape, European countries will continue looking to France for leadership on a range of issues, from the war in Ukraine to the economy, as they brace for a fraying trans-Atlantic partnership with Donald Trump entering in the White House.
The most pressing fear is that Trump will abandon Ukraine, leaving a big gap for Europeans to fill in terms of aid and ammunition as Russian forces continue to advance. Many in the EU will look to France, which – after a slow start – has emerged as Kyiv’s strongest backer among big EU economies.
It wasn’t always like this. France has traditionally favoured an approach of dialogue rather than deterrence towards Russia, sidelining the concerns of former Soviet states in the EU. In the early months after Russia’s invasion, it was the likes of Poland and Lithuania that were calling for robust EU support for Ukraine.
“There are many things that one can criticise about France in light of its stance on Ukraine, particularly on how long it took France to adapt,” Gesine Weber, fellow at the German Marshall Fund, tells The Parliament.
But France has changed its approach. In October, Macron welcomed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Paris to discuss his “victory plan” and additional aid for Ukraine. France’s military is also leading an initiative to train Ukrainian soldiers in eastern France, part of a plan to train an entire brigade on French equipment.
Having adopted this firmer stance, France’s economic heft as compared to its eastern neighbours – as well as its strong military tradition and its status as the EU’s only nuclear power – have given it a natural leadership role.
“Even if Poland has certainly beefed up its defence spending, Poland is not France in terms of economic performance and in terms of military capability,” says Weber. “In terms of diplomatic network, France is certainly a leading middle power.”
Germany leaves a gap
The French economy is second in the EU only to Germany, which has struggled to wean itself off Russian gas imports and whose record on Ukraine has been much weaker. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has consistently refused to deliver long-range cruise missiles to Kyiv over fears they could be used against targets within Russia.
Scholz’s government has effectively collapsed and he will be unable to make any big decisions before elections, which are likely to take place in February. That could then be followed by a lengthy period of coalition-building – the last government formation took three months to be agreed – which will prolong this period of indecision.
“France is currently best placed to take a leadership role in the EU, because it will take some time in Germany for a coalition to come together and someone has to take the first step,” says Weber.
Nevertheless, France’s economic weakness may limit the extent to which it can support Ukraine. With a budget deficit that could hit 6.2 per cent of GDP by the end of 2024, Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu told reporters in October that France would fall short of its pledge to donate up to €3bn in military aid to Ukraine this year, and would only make “above €2bn.”
Trouble at home
France’s budget deficit could also hamper its ability to lead a wave of investment in Europe’s economy – as prescribed by Mario Draghi in his report on how to boost the continent’s competitiveness.
“How can you advocate what the Draghi Report asks for, such as massive borrowing and public investment, when you yourself are not in a position to invest massively?” says Eric Maurice, policy analyst at the European Policy Centre.
To overcome doubts about its economic strength, “France has to convince the EU it is taking this issue seriously,” says Sébastien Maillard, a former director of the Jacques Delors Institute. “Macron is showing he's doing the best he can to bring the budget back on track.”
The installation of Michel Barnier as prime minister in September has been an important first step. Investors expressed relief at his appointment, but his government’s foundations are shaky after this summer’s snap election split the National Assembly into three broad blocs with no majority. Brussels and international markets are on tenterhooks as they wait for Barnier’s spending plan to pass. “For the moment, Barnier is really respected,” a French EU official says.
Institutional power
Besides the European Council, which gathers national leaders, the European Commission is another important avenue for EU governments to influence the bloc’s politics, despite the longstanding myth that each country’s Commissioner should leave their national allegiance at the door of the Berlaymont.
Here, too, France’s power looks diminished compared to five years ago, at the start of President Ursula von der Leyen’s first term. Back then, Commissioner Thierry Breton was on the rise, accumulating powers over a wide range of portfolios and giving a distinctly French flavour to the EU’s top table.
Since then, Ursula von der Leyen has consolidated her power and, in September this year, she blocked Breton’s nomination to remain in the Commission for a second term, asking Macron for another candidate. The man who replaced him, former foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné, has a grander job title as one of six “executive vice-presidents” (EVPs), but less responsibility in practice, with direct control of just one Directorate-General in contrast to Breton’s three.
Besides his leadership of DG Grow, tasked with handling the EU’s internal market, Séjourné has some responsibility on the crucial subject of competitiveness – but must share it with Spain’s Teresa Ribera, another EVP.
“His authority on this crucial issue is not very clear,” says Maurice. A small conciliation is that Séjourné will oversee work on the Capital Markets Union – an important file that has the potential to improve European competitiveness and innovation.
Nevertheless, EU politics overall is moving in a broadly French direction, with the rise of industrial policy and increasing talk of a collective defence policy both playing to French strengths – again standing in contrast to Germany, whose fossil-fuel-dependent industry continues to be battered by Chinese competition, Russian aggression, and the EU’s own decarbonisation drive.
“France's influence has also to be judged in the long run. The wordings and the priorities of the new Commission have been shared for years by France,” a French EU official tells The Parliament.