If a member of the European Union comes under attack, it could take 45 days for other members to get permission to move equipment across borders in response. That’s what a new report has concluded regarding moving military equipment from one country to another.
Russia, which given its renewed aggression along the EU’s eastern flank is the primary suspect in any future scenario, has an advantage in this regard. As a single country, it can more easily move troops and materiel to front-line positions. In Ukraine, it was able to capture over 230 square kilometres of territory within a week during recent offensives.
The European Court of Auditors (ECA), the EU’s internal auditor, has determined that EU militaries are not able to move “fast enough” across the bloc territory. It blames red tape as a major obstacle. Tanks, the report notes, are barred from entering neighbouring countries because they exceed national weight limits. Convoys have been halted at bridges not designed to bear heavy equipment.
ECA President Tom Murphy emphasised the “clear and real need” for faster, more streamlined military transports. He pointed to a troubling lack of coordination at the EU level. The report’s findings reveal a disjointed system ill-prepared for deterring an aggressor — let alone fighting one.
While NATO is chiefly responsible for European defence, the Euro-Atlantic military alliance relies on the EU's member state infrastructure. Rapid force movement across Europe is hindered by narrow roads, insufficient rail capacity, mismatched rail gauges, limited data and mismatched bureaucracy.
Russia’s strategic advantage
“We have to show that we can move troops as fast or faster than the Russians,” Ben Hodges, a former commander of the US Army in Europe, told The Parliament.
During the Cold War, European allies had extensive military transport infrastructure. Many German bridges, for example, still bear signs from that era indicating which are suitable for heavy equipment. Large-scale exercises regularly the allies’ logistical capabilities.
European countries also spent more on defence — well above the 2% of GDP most have struggled to recently return to. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 zapped the sense of urgency and gave rise to the so-called peace dividend.
Public spending fell across the board, as privatisation swept through European societies. This impacted railway networks and other transport infrastructure.
Aside from the Balkans, NATO and EU members turned their attention to far-flung missions in Africa and Asia. Now, the perceived Russian threat has reemerged on their doorstep faster than policies can adapt to meet it.
“At the end of the Cold War, European countries were doing a lot more out-of-area missions,.” Michelle Haas, an associate fellow at the Egmont Institute, told The Parliament. “This shift required different forms of coordination, with less emphasis on military mobility within Europe.”
A military ‘Schengen’
In 2017, then -European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for the creation of a fully-fledged European Defence Union by 2025. The launch of the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative aimed to deepen defence cooperation among willing member states. This included creating military transport corridors to form a “military Schengen” area, allowing for frictionless cross-border movement.
Progress has been slow. The European Commission’s first Military Mobility Action Plan, adopted in 2018, faced numerous delays. A second action plan, launched in 2021, included a €1.69 billion budget for military mobility projects between 2021 and 2027.
Railway bridges were built in Germany, transport links to an army base in Estonia were improved, and a section of road to the Lithuanian-Polish border was developed, among other projects.
Yet demand outstripped available funds. By the end of 2023, the budget was exhausted, leaving a funding gap until the next multi-annual budget period begins in 2028. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has estimated that the EU faces an annual shortfall of €80 billion in transport infrastructure investment. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which is supposed to help unite member state infrastructure, has been underfunded for years.
“Investments in infrastructure and coordination on bureaucratic and legal level with all European states requires a lot of catching up,” Haas said.
One problem is that countries tend to neglect infrastructure along their borders, considering it their neighbour’s responsibility, which Gabriel Felbermayr, director at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, said is not “surprising when the benefits accrue to citizens and businesses from other EU countries.”
Finding the money
The ECA report echoed this lack of cross-border cohesion, which is what the EU strives to overcome. Cohesion funds, which make up roughly one-third of the EU’s 2021-2027 budget and help bridge the gap between the bloc’s richer and poorer members, could be a source of improving military mobility.
Current rules prohibit those funds from being used for military purposes. Defence-related infrastructure investment, however, could be a permissible grey zone.
Dual-use projects — those that could have both a civilian and military function, such as logistics — have kicked off around the bloc. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland have agreed to establish a military transport corridor to ensure smoother logistics operations among them.
Finland and Norway are working on improving rail and road links for military use, as part of the EU’s Military Mobility Initiative. The Baltic region’s railway network is expected to link up to the broader European one by 2030.
“This is good work by nations to try and address what needs to be done,” Hodges, the retired US Army general, said. “But the EU as a whole has got to make streamlining procedures and investing money in the infrastructure a top priority.”