Europe’s lack of a secure supply of critical raw materials is back on the agenda, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighting the vulnerability in April.
“We need critical raw materials. This is all the more important in the context of looming trade restrictions and export bans. We see it already,” Von der Leyen said at a recent conference on energy security.
The topic has been raised periodically over the past two decades, often without much action. But with the global order continuing to unravel and European politicians turning to the idea of strategic autonomy, this time could be different.
Materials such as lithium, rare earths and manganese are crucial for much of the hardware Europe needs to transition away from fossil fuels, from batteries to solar panels. Failure to secure these minerals could jeopardise Europe’s green transition — and prolong its dependency on outside powers, including Russia, for its energy.
“We do not want to replace our dependence on fossil fuels with a dependence on raw materials,” Stéphane Séjourné, the Commission’s industrial policy lead, recently said. “Chinese lithium will not be the Russian gas of tomorrow.”
China has established a dominant position in the global supply chain for these materials. In 2020, it supplied around 98% of the EU’s rare earth consumption. In addition to developing its own resources, China has secured exclusive access to many mines in Africa, which hold about one-third of total global reserves.
This article is part of The Parliament's latest policy report, "Delivering Europe's Clean Industrial Deal."
In 2018, China was estimated to control almost 7% of the total value of African mines, according to a 2024 report by the African Climate Foundation. Today, China owns approximately 41% of Africa's cobalt production thanks to its presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 28% of Africa’s copper production through mines acquired in DRC and Zambia.
China has used its leverage over these supply chains in geopolitical disputes. Earlier this month it halted exports of a wide range of critical minerals to the US, leaving hundreds of American firms, including electric car giant Tesla, scrambling for supplies.
Speaking at the energy security conference in London in April, Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency, called the concentration of raw materials a “risky business” and a “new emerging energy security challenge.”
An awakening years in the making
It is not the first time the EU has faced a harsh wake-up call over its reliance on China for critical raw materials. In 2008, as the world reeled from the global financial crisis, the Commission unveiled its first major strategy to shield EU firms from the soaring prices of critical minerals, driven by an increasingly monopolised industry.
Two years later, the EU’s concerns gained new urgency when China imposed an embargo on rare earth elements to Japan in response to a territorial dispute — an early demonstration of how the minerals market could be used as a geopolitical weapon. Policymakers in Brussels and beyond took notice but ultimately failed to turn the shock into a catalyst for change.
So far, Europe’s most comprehensive attempt to fix its dependency came with the 2022 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) — a law aimed at strengthening the bloc’s ability to source, process and recycle materials deemed essential to its green transition. Under the law, EU countries vowed to collectively mine at least 10% of the bloc’s total consumption and process a minimum of 40% by 2030.
That same year, shared fears of being cut off from these essential raw materials had pushed Europe, the US and several other developed countries into closer co-operation, culminating in the creation of the Minerals Security Partnership. The alliance is designed to mobilise public and private investment in critical mineral supply chains — but may come under pressure following President Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
United mineral diplomacy
Europe has three avenues to reduce its dependency on China for critical raw materials: extracting more resources on its own territory, sourcing them in other markets and developing domestic processing capabilities.
Last month, the EU identified 47 domestic “strategic projects” to extract, process and recycle critical raw materials across 13 member states, requiring a total investment of €22.5 billion, to meet the targets set by the CRMA.
Since 2021, the bloc has also signed 13 raw material agreements with a number of countries, including Canada and Kazakhstan. The latest push in global partnerships came earlier this year, when the EU executive outlined a plan to develop a web of international agreements — dubbed clean trade and investment partnerships — to secure access to materials.
At the London energy security conference, Von der Leyen praised a new EU partnership with South Africa, describing it as a potential blueprint for future bilateral co-operation. “This will see Europe invest €4.4 billion in clean energy projects in South Africa,” the Commission president said, adding that “it will ensure that European firms have access to the materials they need to power the green transition.”
But experts warn that a more competitive global environment means Europe’s diplomatic charm offensive is not guaranteed to succeed.
“Europe needs to make a much stronger effort in how it positions itself towards third countries, especially given the intense competition from China and the US,” Olivia Lazard, a fellow at Carnegie Europe, told The Parliament.
Stressing that “mining doesn’t happen in a vacuum,” Lazard argued that one way to make Europe's value proposition stand out is by addressing the broader concerns of partner countries, most of which are in the global south — from water security and climate adaptation to economic diversification.
The EU is also considering a new mechanism to pool European demand for critical raw materials. However, past failures to co-ordinate, such as the lacklustre joint gas purchasing platform created during the 2022 energy crisis, raise questions about whether Brussels can meet the challenge.
“If you’re not able to sort out joint purchasing for gas, it’s hard to do so for critical raw materials,” said Ben McWilliams, a fellow at the Bruegel economic think tank.
Playing the long game
Still, recent EU initiatives have made some headway, with major institutions on board. Last month, the European Investment Bank — the bloc’s public funding arm — adopted a new critical raw materials initiative to fund projects aligned with the EU’s goals to scale up mining, refining and recycling.
For some experts, however, a more radical approach is required. Silvia Lenaerts, the rector at Eindhoven University of Technology, advocates for a greater focus on innovation rather than simply moving supply chains.
For Lenaerts, a chemist by training, the future lies not in chasing dwindling supplies outside the EU but in innovating beyond them, through advanced materials that can be engineered to reduce dependence altogether.
“If we only think [in terms of] partnerships, we always keep thinking in the same framework,” she told The Parliament. “But if we think from an innovation perspective, we start to think about what we can do differently.”
Sign up to The Parliament's weekly newsletter
Every Friday our editorial team goes behind the headlines to offer insight and analysis on the key stories driving the EU agenda. Subscribe for free here.