Kosovo's ruling Vetevendosje party (VV) slipped to around 41% in Sunday's election — meaning it will need to find a coalition partner to stay in power — but it still accomplished a first for the small Balkan country: completing a full, four-year term in government since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008.
VV's time in power, under Prime Minister Prime Minister Albin Kurti, has been anything but smooth. It's been marked by a period of rising tensions with the Serb minority in the north and growing friction with the European Union and the United States.
Following a brutal, ethnic-fueled war in the late 1990s in what was then disintegrating Yugoslavia, which culminated in NATO intervention, Kosovo’s independence has remained only partially recognized. The EU has struggled to mediate a lasting normalisation agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has worked to stall progress, while Kurti’s distrust of EU-led talks has complicated negotiations. Still, Kosovo remains a candidate for EU membership, albeit tenuously.
For now, Kosovo only has “potential EU candidate” status. Five EU members support Serbia's view and refuse to recognise Kosovo as an independent country. That has effectively frozen accession talks. Kurti’s efforts to dismantle Serbian parallel institutions in the north, strengthen the presence of ethnic Albanians and assert Pristina’s control have prompted Brussels to freeze financial aid.
Kosovo is small, but finds itself in a strategically important region where ethnic tensions and rule of law remain a challenge. Donika Emini, a researcher at Westminster University and director of Civikos Platform, an EU-funded umbrella civil society organisation based in Pristina, spoke to The Parliament to understand the impact of elections.
The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.
How significant were Sunday’s elections for Kosovo?
VV ran not with an offer for the voters, but with a request. They said they needed 500,000 votes to govern alone — a kind of Orban style of rhetoric. Kurti said he wanted to govern alone in order to be able to be more successful in delivering on reforms.
The other parties that were devastated in the previous elections have managed to turn things around with a slight increase in percentage. So now no party will be able to form the government by itself.
If VV cannot find a partner to form a coalition, then the mandate can go to the second-biggest party. Like in every parliamentary republic, whoever has the numbers to form the government can do that.
But if others form the government without Kurti, that can prove convenient for him. It's a very good strategic move because it takes off the responsibility to deliver on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and pressure from the EU, but also from the Trump administration. The fact that the West and the opposition party have tried to resist Kurti for so long, it has contributed to political wins for him. So maybe he calculates on returning stronger.
What are the potential implications for internal security and inter-ethnic relations within Kosovo and for the wider region?
His previous mandate was a difficult one. When Kurti took over, he thought that northern Kosovo was easier. He had never been in the government, nor in the executive. So basically he was speaking from the point of view of an outsider.
All these plans he had envisaged for the north — economic integration, talking to local Serbs — he quickly understood that things in reality are way more complicated than they look.
What Kurti did in the past four years was what Kurti had pledged not to do, which was intervening in the north, playing the stability card in order to then push boundaries and create the negotiation position with Serbia.
It resulted in chaos, which put Kosovo under EU measures, and Kurti is now considered as the leader who is not constructive and doesn’t cooperate. So, what happened? There were tensions in Banjska, the explosion in the water canal, which then heightens the security risk even more.
If you look at it from Kosovo's perspective, northern Kosovo looks like it's more integrated. There are Albanian businesses, chain restaurants, chain supermarkets.
It looks more vibrant and mixed, but it came at a price. Installing Albanian mayors in Serbian-majority municipalities was a point of discontent, which further disintegrated the Serbs from the Kosovo system. There was a boycott of elections by the Serbs and then boycotts of institutions as well, which the Serbs left. The same happened with the police, which had been the biggest success of 2013 agreement between Kosovo-Serbia, signed in Brussels.
Without Kurti, things are not going to magically get better. We have to work a lot in order to make sure that we somehow go to back to zero. Because now we're not fighting for big progress; now we're fighting to go back to zero — to the progress we had achieved.
How are EU measures against Kosovo impacting the country?
With these measures, Kosovo has been excluded by many projects, which could be also regional and at national level. And the financial impacts get even worse now without USAID.
The EU has also refused to meet with Kosovo unless it was related to the Brussels dialogue. So it halted communication. But Kosovo has managed to get through the growth plan, so we have been approved by the EU.
The VV party managed to make the measures appear as a problem of the EU, more than the problem of Kosovo. It is sort of easy to believe that the EU is at fault. It is the EU not managing an asymmetrical approach towards Kosovo and not applying the same standards for others like Serbia. So, the blame is not necessarily on the local political elite but on the EU. There is this growing rhetoric of a discriminative approach towards Kosovo.
Why does the EU nonetheless want to keep Kosovo on its side?
The shift in geopolitical atmosphere does not leave the EU in a very good position on foreign policy and security. But in the Balkans and in Kosovo, in Serbia, the EU has a leverage. They have this ongoing Brussels dialogue, which they could still use as a solid platform, as a low-hanging fruit, to deliver.
The EU has invested 20 years in the region and is very important that it continues to do so. It’s the final stretch, integrating the region, including Kosovo.
It would help a lot in order for Kosovo to feel like we are not just being engaged because Serbia needs the dialogue to unlock a specific chapter that deals with bilateral issues, in order to make it to the EU. We don’t want to be seen as a tool but as a party with strategic interest in the dialogue.
What do you see as the EU's best next steps?
The EU could put Kosovo on the agenda, maybe not of the Polish Presidency, but the next presidency to alleviate or lift these measures. So at least Kosovo does not feel this disadvantaged.
Next, we could see the non-recognisers bypassed to have the candidate status for Kosovo and engage genuinely in the reforms.
EU institutions have a chance to start with a clean slate in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. With [EU Enlargement Commissioner] Marta Kos, [EU High Representative] Kaja Kallas and [Peter] Sørensen, there are a new set of leaders within the EU bubble and the community who could engage differently.
Finally, the EU should continue to support civil society in Kosovo. In order to maintain this strong network of civic activists who are working on promoting this EU integration process and trying to support the reforms. Because most of the time, governments here do not have the capacity nor the courage.