“Economic security” has become a much-discussed term in Brussels policy circles, following the publication of the European Economic Security Strategy in June 2023, the unveiling of the European Economic Security Package in January 2024, and the recent appointment of Maroš Šefčovič as commissioner-designate for trade and economic security. Even DG Trade has been renamed the Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, signalling things to come.
This growing popularity of “economic security” is both welcome and risky. It enables the European Union to more clearly identify and address its vulnerabilities in a precise, tailored and fact-based manner, but it becomes risky when the EU and its member states manipulate the term – interpreting it too broadly, justifying any action under its guise, and using it as a pretext to erect unnecessary barriers.
The best antidote to risky trade dependencies is to diversify them through openness and trusted partners. Economic security should not become synonymous with protectionism. In the upcoming term, we must ensure that economic security serves openness, not the other way around.
This will be a delicate task given the confrontational and transactional geopolitical environment we inhabit, along with the growing rivalry between the US and China. Nevertheless, the EU must continue charting its own course, guided by a clear set of priorities. While we will need to respond to events as our ship navigates the turbulent waters of international trade, we can succeed if we remain clear about our trajectory.
Our top priority should be the expansion and modernisation of our formidable network of 42 preferential trade agreements with 74 partners worldwide. These agreements do more than just create opportunities for our companies beyond the internal market; they extend environmental, climate and workers’ protection beyond our borders, promote quality jobs within the EU, and serve as a crucial source of diversification, shielding us from coercion by outside countries.
The Commission must accelerate negotiations and submit trade agreements to the European Parliament for approval sooner rather than later. If we turn our backs on our partners, others will be quick to fill the vacuum. There are significant trade agreements on the horizon with Indonesia, Australia, Mexico, Thailand and Mercosur, to name a few. Some of these will be divisive but we should not shy away from voting. We were elected to take decisions.
Our second priority should be to “act European.” The Commission must ensure that trade policy does not become hostage to the narrow interests of particular interest groups in individual member states. Trade policy is, and should remain, an exclusive competence of the union. Too often, our competitors employ “divide and rule” tactics with member states; this must stop. Member states need to realise that they will all be worse off if EU trade policy is weakened and fragmented.
Lastly, we need to legislate smartly, implement effectively and communicate clearly. Several new tools, including autonomous measures introduced in the previous legislature like the regulation on foreign subsidies and the anti-coercion instrument, are now in place. We will need a coherent “economic security doctrine” to determine how and when these tools should be used, ensuring coherence and predictability for outside countries, including those with hostile intentions toward the union.