Hungary's recent decision to extend its lax visa scheme to Russians and Belarusians has added to European ire at Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. At least 67 MEPs published an open letter demanding the European Commission “take urgent measures” to address potential security risks. The Commission has given Hungary until 19 August to answer questions. If unresolved, some EU officials have threatened to bring up Hungary’s status in the visa-free Schengen area.
Manfred Weber, the chair of the European People’s Party that Orbán’s Fidesz party was once part of, said Hungary’s decision would “create grave loopholes for espionage activities, and potentially allowing large numbers of Russians to enter Hungary with minimal supervision.”
The Parliament spoke to András Rácz, a senior research fellow in Russian security and foreign policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), to better understand the gravity of the situation.
Why are these new visa rules causing such a stir?
The main reason is that there is no justification given why employment for Russian and Belarusian workers should be simplified. Hungary has, like every other country, a fairly complex set of employee regulations — for everything from tourism visas to student visas, people arriving for healthcare treatment, people arriving for family visits. There's an entire set of various types of visas and residence permits which have their own regulations.
At the beginning of this year, one new form of residence permit was added to the list — the so-called National Card. The intention has been to make it easier for workers from the neighbouring countries, or countries not that far away, to get employed in Hungary — like Serbia, Ukraine or Montenegro, for example. But in mid-July, without any explanation, the eligibility was extended to two new countries: the Russian Federation and Belarus. And there is no justification given why this was necessary.
What could be the reasons?
One possible explanation could be that the construction of Hungary's new nuclear power plant would reach such a development phase that it's necessary for a large number of Russian engineers and specialised workers to come and do the actual building of the nuclear technological part. But the power plant construction is just not at that phase. So it's not justified at all. And even if the power plant construction would be in such a phase, this still wouldn't justify why Belarusians also need to get added to the list.
Critics say the National Card bypasses Schengen regulations. Is that the case?
Nobody knows. I checked the law. The entire [Hungarian visa] decree is just 11 lines long. That is very, very short — for student visas it's about three pages. It is under-regulated.
If Hungary allows 50,000 Russian citizens to come, of course they would be able to flood the Schengen system because there are no detailed security checks required. And then of course the risk of espionage would go higher. But we just don't know how many of these National Cards will be given. There is no numerical limitation at all. It all depends on how many such National Cards Hungary issues and with what speed.
How serious is the espionage threat?
One cannot say for sure, but because the National Card is so under-regulated the potential threat is there. For example, Russians usually send their undercover agents to the EU by using non-biometric passports. In an EU country, you cannot get a non-biometric passport anymore. If Hungary had been concerned about the espionage risks, it could have been written into the law that this National Card could be given only to holders of biometric passports.
I personally think that this is a bit overhyped. The danger is not clear and present. The potential, however, is there.
Does this discussion place Russian and Belarusian citizens under general suspicion?
Since the beginning of the full-scale escalation [in Ukraine], it has become extremely complicated for Russian and Belarusian citizens to get EU visas. If now Hungary introduces a scheme which makes it a lot easier for them, this of course contradicts the practice of other EU allies. A simplified Hungarian residence permit procedure clearly contradicts the practice followed by other EU member states.
An 11-line decree seems more like provocation than policy. Is this Orbán just looking to score political points?
Regarding the process of writing and adopting laws from a technical perspective, there has been a substantial degradation in recent years. The overall quality of the functioning of the Hungarian state administration has degraded considerably. Fourteen years of an increasingly authoritarian rule, 14 years of increasing political control over the state administration — this usually results in a gradual degeneration of the level of professionalism. Hungary is no exception.
However, my impression is that this regulation on the National Card has been done so vaguely intentionally. There is a lot of room for interpreting the rules by the ones who implement them. From what can be reconstructed from open sources, the entire thing makes no sense. There is no major Russian investment in Hungary other than the nuclear power plant. And there is no major Belarusian investment project at all. Belarus has one major business in Hungary — an assembly plant for agricultural tractors — but it has been there for ages.
What does this tell us, if anything, about Orbán’s relationship to Russia?
The Russians and the Belarusians were added to the list two days after Orbán returned from Moscow. So, timing is a bit unusual. Hungary has done much less against Russian espionage than any other EU or NATO member state. Hungary is the only country which did not expel Russian intelligence operatives operating under diplomatic cover in large numbers. I'm not aware of a single expulsion.
Everywhere in eastern Europe you have dedicated research centres studying Russian hybrid warfare, be it state organisations or specialised NGOs. Think tanks are increasing Russian-related capabilities everywhere except in Hungary. Until the US sanctioned it, Hungary hosted Russia's infamous international investment bank. It provided an open door for Russian spies to come and go. So Hungary has been behaving fairly differently from other EU and NATO countries already for a while — way before the full-scale escalation.
What does all this mean for Hungary's EU presidency?
What's happening has been strongly contradicting the Hungarian messages that were delivered before the presidency. All Hungarian officials, behind open and closed doors, all stated that this is going to be a low-profile, technical and reliable presidency. So far, exactly the opposite has been happening.
It would be fairly unusual to take away the presidency from Hungary. And because the new Commission is still getting formed and because of all the institutional procedures, the Hungarian presidency will have very limited actual influence. Hungary will keep conducting the presidency, but it will be increasingly isolated, with many EU countries downgrading their level of representation.
What do you think Orbán is trying to achieve with this confrontational behaviour?
For Hungary's national interests, this whole thing is counterproductive. Based on open sources, Orbán's logic and background motives cannot be reconstructed. Before the European elections, which in Hungary coincided with the local elections, one could have argued that he was using confrontation against the EU as a domestic political campaign topic. It happens in many countries.
And yet, the confrontation continues. This behaviour makes no sense. Some people say that Orbán is preparing for getting Hungary out of the EU, but that's just not rational and would result in an immediate economic Armageddon.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.