France faces a political crisis. Its government is in shambles.
A vote in the National Assembly on Wednesday night saw conservative political veteran, Michel Barnier, ousted from his role as prime minister. He took the job just 90 days ago, making him the shortest-serving prime minister in the history of the French Fifth Republic.
The turmoil leaves the country’s already weakened president, Emmanuel Macron, with few good options at a pivotal time for France and the European Union. Macron has been trying to project strength against the backdrop of war in Ukraine, an incoming Trump presidency and political turmoil next door in Germany.
“My priority is stability,” Macron told reporters on a visit to Saudi Arabia on Tuesday, rejecting any notion that he might step down.
To gain some clarity in a politically chaotic time, The Parliament spoke to Sébastien Maillard, a former director of the Jacques Delors Institute, a European policy think tank based in Paris.
The following interview, conducted the day after the no-confidence vote passed, has been edited for length and clarity.
How historic is what happened this week?
A vote of no confidence to a government is very rare. It's the second time in the history of the Fifth Republic. What is also historical is the collision of the far right and the far left against this government, run by a mainstream party. So it's not just Barnier. It's the vote itself and what it tells of the political movements in the country.
Barnier behaved like the statesman that he is until the very end, and I think he will be respected for that. In his final words at the National Assembly, he tried to make peace with reality, and he reminded everyone of the deepness of the deficit and what needs to be done. He said that a dissolution would not have some magic curing effect. And things could only get worse.
What is Macron’s next move?
The timing here is very important. He cannot afford to have just a caretaker government for too long, one but one with a broader political backing that will thus last longer. This will not only please the politicians here in France, but also the National Assembly and the markets. The French will like it. The urgency is to reassure not only the French, but France's partners — like the EU, the European Commission, Germany, and all France's allies and Ukraine, as well. He has to prove that the state is still running and able to function properly. And that's really on his shoulders.
[Macron] has to bring down any speculation of his dismissal or of his resignation because that will just fuel more political crises. The presidency is one of the pillars of the country, and he has to show he is not affected.
Macron’s approval ratings are low, around 23%. Would this not be a natural time to step down?
I see your logic, but his predecessors never did it — except De Gaulle in 1969 after a vote, which he lost. But I think this time there’s no obviously popular alternative candidate. That’s an issue.
There was a survey this week that said there was a deep mistrust of the French against all politicians. Macron’s ratings are probably as low as [Francois] Hollande or [Nicolas] Sarkozy’s were. So if he were to step down he would really give way to [far-right National Rally leader Marine] Le Pen. That doesn't excuse him, however. He is responsible for the snap elections that caused the standstill.
The new prime minister, whoever that may be, will face the same issues as Barnier: a gridlocked National Assembly. How can they change things when Barnier couldn’t?
It may be wishful thinking, but there could be a slow change of mindset in the National Assembly. They’ll realise they cannot do this over and over again. And some of the Socialists will say: ‘Although we voted against Barnier, perhaps we need to compromise a bit more.’ There are also some voices from the Greens saying that.
The real thing that can break the deadlock is if the Socialists were to leave the [left-wing alliance] New Popular Front, to really then collaborate and cooperate with the centrists and the Republicans.
France is a country with high debt and relatively low economic growth. How does it move forward from that?
Barnier’s task was to get the deficit from 6.1% to 5% next year, which is the first step. And to enter with a trajectory until 2029 that has been approved by the Commission. So as long as they stick to that, it will be fine. There may be a way that the government could also raise taxes but keep the spending as it was in the previous budgetary year. And if so, you would see more French households paying taxes, but it would reduce the deficit. So it's not democratically pleasing, but it could do the trick. So that's one solution.
The other would be to have a proper new government that is able to find some compromise with the parliament to make the necessary cuts. But we saw with Barnier how difficult it was. No one wanted to tighten the belt.
How will this affect France’s relationship with the EU?
Regarding the budget, I expect the Commission and the other partners of the EU to be patient and to be lenient over the coming months, because Germany itself isn't in good shape either. And they don't want to fuel more political crises.
The immediate pressure would come from the markets before it would come from Brussels. That's one thing. The other is regarding European initiatives, like the Mercosur deal or support to Ukraine — this could hamper France's capacity to take its time. Either the Commission doesn't want to upset France and go against its will on the Mercosur deal or it says, ‘Well, the country is not in a position to politically weigh in.’ If they were going to go that way, that would also fuel anti-EU sentiment in France that could end up not helping the EU itself.
France will not be in the position to take major initiatives when it comes to supporting Ukraine, which depends on the budget. It also comes at a time where they’ll need to respond to Trump's possible trade war on the EU. The way we respond to it is in the hands of the Commission, because it's in charge of the trade policy. But France's capacity to weigh in on the mandate given to the Commission on that will wane.
Also, we expect Germany to be incapacitated until next Easter. So that’s two decisionmakers. It's really a moment where, at least for the first quarter of 2025, there will be no Franco-German motor.